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PACKER INTEGRATION INTO HOG PRODUCTION: 
CURRENT STATUS AND LIKELY IMPACTS OF 
INCREASED VERTICAL CONTROL ON HOG PRICES 
AND QUANTITIES 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
INTRODUCTION: 
In a survey conducted three years ago by the staff of Pork '88, it was found 
that some of the major players in the pork industry, like Smithfield foods, for 
example, have either integrated into hog production or have all the requirements 
for vertical integration in place. The move toward internalizing the exchange 
process in the hog/pork sector through vertical integration has raised several 
questions ranging from its impact on prices and quantities to its impact on 
individual hog producers. 
This report is a first step toward studying these issues. Its specific objectives 
are a) to provide some insights into the nature and determinants of vertical 
integration, b) to describe the current status of packer integration into hog 
production, and c) to provide a theoretical and empirical assessment of the likely 
impact of increased vertical control in the hog industry on hog prices and 
quantities. 
As a background, Chapter I describes supply/demand characteristics as well 
as structural characteristics of the hog/pork sector. Among agricultural com-
modities, and particularly livestock, the pork sector is characterized by cyclical 
output response, unresponsive short run demand, and a trend toward large scale 
specialization into hog production and slaughter. 
INCENTIVES FOR VERTICAL INTEGRATION TRANSACTIONAL 
ECONOMIES: 
The supply/demand characteristics as well as some aspects of the structural 
characteristics of the hog/pork industry make the hog sector a good candidate for 
vertical integration. The incentives for vertical integration are created by the 
existence of transactional economies. 
In practical terms, transactional economies exist when the cost of open 
market exchange exceeds the costs of gaining control over quality, quantity, and 
price of the intermediate product either through direct ownership or contracting. 
If processors integrate to achieve the transactional economies and the market 
remains competitive, the cost savings from integration eventually will be passed 
on to the producer or consumer. 
Under transactional economies there are three main sources for the incentive 
to integrate, namely risk and uncertainty, economic efficiency and assuring 
adequate supply inputs. 
iii 
The more prone an industry is to uncertain supply of a material input, the more 
likely it will opt for vertical integration or contracts as a risk-reducing strategy. 
The economic rationale for this behavior is simple. Other inputs, such as labor, 
for example have to be combined with the material input to produce a final output 
Thus, as the material input becomes more"uncertain", the ability to utilize the 
cost-minimizing levels of all inputs becomes more difficult 
While economies of scale may exist at all stages of production and/or 
marketing, it may happen that one stage is subject to substantially more scale 
economies that the next or previous stage. Data on the emerging structures in hog 
packing and hog production points to the divergent scales between the two stages. 
Consequently, a packer may opt for integration though ownership or contracts 
with several producers to match his scale of operation and, hence, improve 
economic efficiency. 
Uncertainty about the quality of inputs also induces business to integrate in 
order to have a say about how the material input is produced. Obviously, vertical 
integration through ownership gives the processor complete management control. 
Contractual integration through market-specification contracts or resource pro-
viding contracts also gives the processor some control over production practices. 
Assurance of adequate supply is perhaps the most often cited incentive for 
processors to integrate backward into agricultural production. However, the 
notion of"assuring supplies" is more than just avoidance of random fluctuations 
in input markets. It entails the inability to obtain the quantity and quality of inputs 
that the firm would like to purchase at the prevailing price. As such, it is a market 
imperfection and gives rise to transaction costs. The latter are different from 
production costs in that they arise from using the open market for transactions. 
Whether a business opts for market exchange or integration depends on cost 
conditions of the processing plant, variability of the raw material flows, and the 
Dollars/units 
AC 
Quantity 
Figure 1. 
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cost associated with market exchange. Consider Figure 1 where the U-shape 
curve represent the average cost function for a typical processing plant. The 
minimum average cost of production occurs at point If the firm is only able 
to purchase quantity Q1, its average cost of processing rises from and AC1 
or somewhere in between depends on the number of days (shifts) the firm is 
compelled to operate at less than full capacity. For example, if the processor 
operates at less than full capacity half of the time, then its annual production will 
be at at an average cost of The potential cost saving due to integration 
are represented by the distance to Whether a business integrates 
backward to assure supplies, depends on whether the cost savings more than 
offset the costs of internally producing the material input or acquiring it through 
contracts. 
IMPERFECT COMPETITION 
Another less obvious phenomenon which gives rise to several incentives for 
processors to vertically integrate, aside from transactional economies, is imper-
fect competition. Imperfect competition may arise for example, when there is 
increased concentration in the slaughter industry. 
Are there signs which indicate the slaughter industry may be characterized 
by imperfect competition? Well, the leading packers in the seventies have been 
replaced by companies that specialize in high volume, low cost plants. This has 
occurred only in those plants slaughtering more than one million head annually. 
The share of the latter plants in total hog slaughter increased by more than 
percent between the year 1972 and 1988 and amounted to more than 75 percent 
of total U.S. hog slaughter (Figure 2). The consensus among those who follow 
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v 
the industry closely is that of slaughtering concentration will increase over the 
next few years. 
During this period of industry transformation, more than plants have shut 
down across the United States, as have 217 auction yards, 372 dealer and order 
buyers and 3 terminal markets. A consequence of this declin_e is that fewer outlets 
are available for producers to sell their hogs. In a recent Farm Bureau Survey, it 
was found that 76 percent of those responding have access to only one or two 
markets. 
Economic theory predicts that when a market for an intermediate input is 
imperfect, the price and quantity of the intermediate inputs would be less than 
what they would be had the market been perfectly competitive. The degree to 
which the quantity and price of the input diverge from the competitive level 
depends on the degree of market power exercised by the buyers of the interme-
diate inputs. The degree of market power is a function of three things: the number 
of firms, the nature of strategic behavior between the buyers, and the degree of 
supply response by the producers of the intermediate inputs. 
The incentives under imperfect competition come from three sources: 
internalization of the efficiency losses from imperfect competition, 2) the ability 
to extractrents from the competitive producers,and 3) the ability to price discriminate 
among the competitive producers of the intermediate inputs. Economic theory 
also predicts that when the price of the intermediate inputs diverges from its 
competitive levels, an efficiency loss arises. In practical terms, the efficiency loss 
is the difference between the dollar loss to consumers and producers (engendered 
by market imperfections) and the extra profits made by the processor (also 
engendered by market imperfections). Interestingly, one way for the processor 
to convert the efficiency loss to profits is through backward integration. After we 
presentsomeresultsofoursurvey, wewillsimulatethepriceandquantityimpacts 
of increased vertical integration under the scenario of imperfect competition. 
Contractual and Ownership Integration-Survey Results 
Our survey results indicate that, on a national level, (Figure 3) hog packers 
who slaughter head or less annually acquired about 38.56 percent of their 
Public Markets 
Direct Purchase 
Hogs Cattle 
Figure 3. Slaughter Hogs/Cattle by Source Packer size < head 
hogs from public markets, 58.64 percent by direct purchase, and 2.67 percent 
through forward cash contacts. The percentage of hogs actually owned and fed 
bythehogpackerincompanyownedfacilitiesrepresentedonly0.13percent. The 
seventy two hog packers who responded to the survey represent more than half 
the actual packer population in the< category reported in 1988. Assuming 
the response to our survey is representative of this category, and knowing that 
close to hogs were slaughtered by packers in the head and less 
category, roughly hogs were owned and fed in packer-owned facilities. 
Figure 3 also shows the same breakdown for beef packers in the same size 
category. It is worth noting that while acquiring cattle through contracts 
represents only 1 percent in this size category, compared to 3 percent in hogs, 
about 5 percent of the cattle is actually owned in this category. About two percent 
is owned and fed in custom lots and 3 percent is owned and fed in company-owned 
lots. 
Packer ownership of hogs in company-owned facilities is a little bit higher 
in the to head category. It represented about percent of all 
hogs in this category and range from to percent. The rest was acquired from 
either public markets or direct purchase (Figure 4). Figure 4 also shows how the 
distribution of hogs by source compares with cattle. Again, cattle owned and fed 
in company facilities in this category is more than three times that of hogs. One 
beef packer in this category reported owning percent of his slaughter cattle. 
Public Markets 
Hogs Cattle 
Figure 4. Slaughter Hogs/Cattle by Source Packer size 99,999 head 
Figures 5 and 6 show the distribution of hogs by source for the two size 
categories - 299,999 head and> head, respectively. In the 
- 299 ,999 head category, none of the hogs were contracted orowned. On 
the other hand, 1.43 percent of cattle in the same category were forward 
contracted and close to 3 percent were owned and fed in custom lot facilities. 
In higher category,> head (Figure 6), close to 8 percent of hogs fall 
in the captive category, of which 3.64 percent is forward contracted, 2 percent 
is owned and fed in custom facilities, and 1.86 percent in company-owned 
facilities. Assuming the proportion of the captive hog supplies are representative 
vii 
Hogs Cattle 
Figure 5. Slaughter Hogs/Cattle by Source Packer size 299,999 head 
Public Markets 
Hogs Cattle 
Figure 6. Slaughter Hogs/Cattle by Source Packer size> head 
of the population (57 plants), the total number of hogs in> category is 
roughly 5.8 million head. Beef packers in this category, on the other hand, 
acquired about 11 percent of their supply through contracts and 1.4 percent 
through ownership and feeding in custom lots. 
Figure 7 summarizes the above information across sizes. It is worth noting 
that while contracting and ownership of cattle seems to take place across all sizes 
Public Markets Direct Purchase Forward Contracts 
Custom Lots Company Owned Lots 
Figure 7. Slaughter Hogs/Cattle By Source and Category 
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Figure 8. Degree oflntegration and Hog Slaughter for Different ES 
in beef packing, it is mostly prevalent among the large sizes in hog packing. 
Information on the regional breakdown is in the text 
SIMULATING THE IMPACT OF INCREASED VERTICAL CONTROL. 
Figure 8 simulates the impact of increased vertical integration on the volume 
of hog slaughter under different elasticities of Supply As the degree of 
integration increases, the volume of hog slaughter also increases. For example 
at an elasticity of supply of a level of percent integration will bring forth 
about 3.8 percent increase in the volume of hog slaughter. Figure 8 also shows 
that as hog supply becomes more responsive, the quantity of hogs forthcoming 
to the market is also higher. Figure 9 shows the relationship between the degree 
of vertical integration and hog slaughter under varying demand responses, 
holding the supply elasticity at a value of The more responsive the demand 
ED= 
ED= 1 ...... ................ 
.................................. .... -................ -........ -.... -. ..... ......... . --.... -................. -: .......... -
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Figure 9. Degree of Integration and Hog Slaughter for Different ED 
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Figure Degree of Integration and Quantities from Independents (ES) 
curve is the more quantity of hogs forthcoming under increasing levels of vertical 
integration. This also implies that the consumer benefits from lower prices of pork 
as output expands. 
Figure demonstrates the relationship between the degreeofintegration and 
the quantities of hogs purchased from independents. Obviously, although the 
total quantity of hogs slaughtered increased, the quantity purchased from 
independent hog producers is predicted by the model to decrease by more than 
the increase slaughter. For example, at a ten percent level of integration, total 
slaughter goes up by 3.8 percent but the quantity purchased from independents 
declines by 13 .3 percent. This means, given the magnitude of supply and demand 
elasticities, that 17 percent of the hogs are being captive by the processor. Figure 
11 shows the same relationship between the degree of integration and purchases 
of independents under varying demand responses. 
.3 .3S .4 .4S .7 .7S .8S 1 
Degree of Integration 
Figure 11. Degree of Integration and Quantities from Independents (ED) 
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Figure 12. Degree of Integration and Price Received by Independents (ES) 
According to Figure 12, the price to independents also declines with Vertical 
integration. At the ten percent level of integration the price paid to independents 
declines by about six percent. At fifty percent integration, the price declines by 
about 26 percent The more responsive the hog supply curve is, the steeper the 
decline in the price of independents. Similarly, the more elastic the demand 
curve, the steeper the price received by independents. (Figure 13). 
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Figure 13. Degree of Integration and Price Received by Independents (ED) 
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CHAPTER I. 
INTRODUCTION 
Background 
Successful performance of a "food supply system requires the coordination 
of thousands of decisions made by thousands of producers, processors, wholesal-
ers, distributors, retailers and consumers. When markets are perfect, prices are 
the most effective coordinating force. They automatically ration consumption 
among those who are willing and able to buy the product, reward those who 
produce it, provide incentives for changes in consumption and production, and 
guide goods and services through the marketing channels. In this an automatic 
coordinating mechanism, "every consumer and producer sits in on the price 
committee, as it were, and casts his dollar vote as to what should be produced and 
consumed and what prices are needed to do the job of allocating and rationing" 
(Shephard, p. 
The ability ofa "food supply system" to move the product from farm to retail 
depends on a) the nature of supply and demand, and b) market structure. The 
nature of supply and demand refers to the degree to which consumers and 
producers respond to price changes, in the short-run and long-run, as well as other 
non-price factors which influence the level of demand and supply. Market 
structure refers to those "organizational characteristics of a market that largely 
determine where the market falls in the competition/monopoly spectrum, ... and 
is a primary determinant of how much discretion a firm has in setting itsrivalrous 
strategies or other aspects of firm conduct" (Connor and Wills, p.126). 
Hog Supply Characteristics 
Among agricultural commodities, and particularly livestock, the pork sector 
is characterized by cyclical output response. The cycles reflect aggregate 
producer response to current as well as expected profitability of the enterprise. 
When profit opportunities are on the horizon, individual producers expand. The 
combined effect of all producers expanding output subsequently depresses 
prices. If input prices do not decline to offset the output price decline, profits are 
depressed. Some producers size their operations down, others leave the business. 
Liquidation and exit from the business leads to smaller supplies of pork, prices 
tend higher again, and the cycle continues. 
McCorlde defines a "food supply system .. as that system which encompasses the following 
activities: production of raw products and other inputs such as packaging materials, the 
ing activities which transform inputs into consumer products in their final form or into intermediate 
products that are combined with other inputs into a final consumer product; and the storage, 
marketing, and distributional activities that make food products available at a time and place to best 
match consumers' desires, as reflected in demand prices 2-3). 
1 
The evidence of output cyclicity (in tenns liveweight production) in the hog 
sector can be seen in Table 1.1. Between and 1986, there were nine cycles 
ranging in length from two to seven years. The most frequent length was four 
years. Length of expansion phases ranged from one to five years with an average 
2.4 years. The average length of contraction phases was 1.8 years with a range 
from one to three years. The cyclicity of output is complicated by the lag between 
the time producers decide to change output and the time actual changes 
materialize. It takes almost one year between breeding and finishing a slaughter 
hog for market, and longer than that to augment the breeding herd. 
Table 1.1. Hog production cycles 
Years 
1954-58 
1958-61 
1961-65 
1965-69 
1969-73 
1973-75 
1975-82 
1982-86 
Length of 
4 years 
4 years 
3 years 
4 years 
4 years 
4 years 
2 years 
7 years 
4 years 
Number of Years 
Increased 
2 
2 
1 
3 
3 
2 
1 
5 
1 
Average length of production cycles, 
Average length of increased cycles, 
Average length of decreased cycles, 
Source: Futrell and Williams. 
Number of Years 
Decreased 
years 
2.4 years 
1.8 years 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
3 
Holt and Johnson estimated the response of pork production to changes in the 
farm price of hogs , the price of com, and interest rates. They found thatan increase 
in hog prices actually results in decreased production in subsequent periods. The 
rationale for this is that hogs are both a consumption and investment good. In 
practical tenns, when current and expected prices of hogs are on the rise, 
producers respond by saving more gilts and reducing sow slaughter. Only after 
about 4 quarters does the higher price translate into increased production. It also 
takes about 4 quarters before an increase in the price of com or interest rates 
materializes into decreased production. Holt and Johnson's results also showed 
that hog production is more responsive to changes in com price than hog price 
or interest rates. 
2 
Pork Demand Characteristics 
Consumer demand for pork, is relatively unresponsive to price changes 
(inelastic). In practical terms, a one percent change in the price of pork generates 
less than one percent change in the quantity demanded. Consumer demand for 
pork is even less responsive to changes in consumer income. Table 1.2 summa-
rizes estimates of responsiveness of the consumer purchases of pork, beef, veal, 
other red meats, chicken and turkey. 
Table 1.2. Price Responsiveness of consumer purchases for meats. 
Percentage of With respect to a one percentage change in the price of: 
Change in the 
Quantity of· Other Expen-
Beef Pork Meat Chicken Turkey ditures 
Beef and Veal 
Pork 
Other Meat -1.3712 
Chicken 
Turkey 
Source: Huang and Haidacher. 
A percent decrease in the price of pork at retail, holding the other prices 
constant, will bring in about a 7 percent increase in pork consumption. Increases 
or decreases in the price of substitutes - namely beef, chicken and turkey, also 
has an influence on consumer purchases of pork. Beef is the chief competitor, 
followed by chicken and turkey. Note, however, that a change in the pork price 
impacts consumer purchases of chicken almost three times more than a one 
percent change in the price of chicken on consumer purchases of pork, impacts 
consumer purchases of beef twice as much as a 1 percent change in the price of 
beef on pork consumption, and impacts purchases of turkey 18 times greater than 
a 1 percent change in the price of turkey on pork consumption. A pork-demand 
price elasticity of -.73, holding other prices constant, translates to a price 
flexibility of -1.4. In practical terms, a percent increase in the quantity of pork 
supplied would require about a 14 percent decrease in price to clear the market 
Structural Change - Hog Production 
Figure 1.1 shows the structural trends in hog production as represented by the 
number of U.S. farms selling hogs and pigs by size groups. Between 1959 and 
1987, the number of farms selling hogs and pigs declined by more than percent 
(from to farms). The largest decline, 89 percent, has been in 
the category marketing less than head. For categories selling between 
3 
Source: Compiled from Rhodes 
1-99 head 
head 
head 
head 
D over head 
1959 1969 1978 1982 1987 
Figure 1.1: Number of U.S. Hog Farms by Size Groups 
and 199 head, and and 499 head, the decline has been 79 percent (from 
to farms) and 44 percent (from 81,000 to 45,000 farms), 
respectively. The only category showing a secular upward trend in numbers is the 
category with more than 1000 head in sales (from to 24,000). More 
interestingly, within the 1000 and more category, the largest percentage increase 
in the number of farms are those selling 5000 head and more (Figure 1.2). They 
increased by 65 percent between the 1978 and 1987 census years (from 727 to 
farms). 
Larger size farms are also important in terms of their share of total hogs and 
pigs marketings (Figure 1.3). The share in marketings of farms selling head 
and less decreased from 66.4 percent to 42.5 percent in 1987. The share in 
marketings of farms selling 1000 head and more increased from 34 percent in 
1978 to 58 percent in 1987. Likewise, the most noticeable increase in the share 
4 
1978 1982 
bead 
bead 
over bead 
1987 Source: Compiled from Rhodes 
Figure 1.2: Number of Large US. Farms Marketing Hogs by Size Groups 
... 
bead 
bead 
bead 
D bead 
1978 1982 
Figure 1.3: U.S. Marketings of Pork by Size of Farm 
1987 
Source: Compiled from Rhodes 
5 
of marketings took place in farms selling head and more. Their share of total 
marketings increased from 7 percent in 1978 to 17.1 percent in 1987. 
Figure 1.4 gives market shares of hogs and pigs by size of farm and by region. 
The regions are the West North Central Region (WNC), the East North Central 
Region(ENC),theNortheastemRegion(NE)theSouthAtlanticRegion(SA)the 
South Central region and the Western region (W) Appendix for 
definition of regions). 
Percent 
.. ................... .................... .. . 
..... ........... . 
!§.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.:.: .:. :.: . : . :.:.: . :.:.:.:.:.: 
....................... . 
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Figure 1.4: Regional Market Shares of Pork Marketed by Size of Farm 
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Note that while market share of the com belt has been pretty stable between 1978 
and 1987, the contribution of the region's smaller farms to total marketings of 
hogs and pigs is proportionately higher than in other regions. The picture is clearer 
on a state level. Figure 1.5 shows the distribution of marketing of pigs by size of 
farm for the ten leading states in 1987. In Iowa, the leader in the total number of 
total hogs marketed, about 43 percent of hogs still come from smaller farms 
compared to percent from larger farms. On the other hand, in North Carolina, 
which ranks 6th in total hog marketings, close to 58 percent of the volume comes 
from farms marketing head and more. We may tentatively conclude, that 
the further away hog production is from com production, the larger the volume 
(in percentage terms) from larger farms. 
AR NC NE Ml KS IN IL 1A MN 
s,ooo 
Source: Compiled from Rhodes 
Figure 1.5: Distribution of Marketing of Pork by Size of Farm 
The growth rates of marketings by size of farm also vary by region (Figure 
1.6). Between the year 1982 and 1987 the largest growth in marketings from all 
sizes occurred in the NE region. The WNC has actually shown a decline of 2 
percent in marketings. However, for the com belt (WNC and ENC) as a whole, 
there has been a net increase of only 4.6 percent. This compared to more than 14 
percent in the NE and percent in the region. The growth rate in marketings 
from small farms head) showed a decline in all regions except the 
Nebraska growth in marketing from larger farms(> head) was positive for 
all regions with the largest gain in the region. 
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Figure 1.6: Growth Rates, 1978-87 of Marketing Pork by Region and Farm Size 
Structural Change - Hog Slaughter 
While the hog slaughtering and processing industry has not experienced 
significantly increased national concentration compared to beef (Table 1.3), it 
has undergone major regional transformation in the s. With the expansion 
of IBP into hog slaughter, and the emergence of Excel and Conagra as major 
players in the industry, the leading packers in the seventies have been replaced 
by companies that specialize in high volume and low cost slaughter (Hayenga and 
McDaniel). Evidence of this shift toward high volume hog slaughter is shown in 
Figure 1.7 The growth in number and relative importance of hog slaughtering 
plants has occurred only in those plants slaughtering more than one million head 
annually. The share of the latter plants in total hog slaughter increased by more 
than percent between the year 1972 and 1988 and amounted to more than 75 
percent of total U.S. hog slaughter (Figure 1.8). The consensus among those who 
follow the industry closely is that hog slaughtering concentration will increase 
over the next few years (Ward, 
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Table 1.3. Concentration Ratios For U.S. Meatpacking, 1947-1987 
Beef Veal Lamb Pork 
CR4 CR8 CR4 CR8 CR4 CR8 CR4 CR8 
Percent 
1947 
1954 36 43 49 56 61 74 42 56 
1958 31 38 41 69 39 53 
1963 26 34 36 44 54 67 36 
1967 26 35 37 57 73 33 48 
1972 42 27 46 55 76 37 
1977 25 36 32 56 58 82 37 55 
1982 44 55 55 74 59 86 39 59 
1987 74 92 85 99 76 99 
CR4 and CR8 are respectively the percent of industry value of shipment by the 
plants of the four and eight leading firms. 
Source: Connor 
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Figure 1.7: Number of U.S. Hog Slaughtering Plants by Size Categories -1972-1988 
9 
75 .. ,,,.,·· 
,.,.. . 
: :::::::: ::::: : :: : : :: :: : : :: : :: :::: :: ::: : :: :: ::::::: :::: : : : :: : :: ::: :: ::::::::: : : : :: :: ::>:~:<~:: : ::::::: : : 65 / 
.. . . .. . .. ... .... ... .. ... . ... . . ... . . . ....... . . . .. r"::.:·.":-:·::-:. •• _,._,_ .• .,..,_,.,{. than 
- i 99,000 
·::::::::::::::;:.::::.:s.:::::::::::z::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::. 
- - - ' / - 299,999 45 ·"'·································, ···r········································· 
i "" 
. =;..-.L.>''.>..-.;.;..;;L;;;.;: 
....... . .. . . .. . .. .... . .. .... ...... . ... ...... . ....... . ..... .. . . ... ..... . ........ . ........ .. ...... . ""':-:-..·.:.::.:····· 
15 .......... ... .. ... ... ... .. .... ...... .. ..... .... ..... ..... ..... .... .. .. ..... ......... ...... ........... ... ... ... . . 
.. ········ 
.·.·;·;.;.....:.....·.·.:......·.-.-.-.-.-.-.. ..-.:.......:;.:.....:........;:: 
01-===========================================---
(. .......... ___......__._...___.__......__.___......__.__._....__.___.... 
Year 
Figure 1.8: Percent of Total Hog Slaughter Source: Compiled from Rhodes (1990) 
During this period of industry transformation, more than plants have shut 
down across the United States, as have 217 auction yards, 372 dealer and order 
buyers and three terminal markets (McNabney). A consequence of this decline 
is that fewer outlets are available for producers to sell their hogs. In a recent Farm 
Bureau Survey, it was found that 76 percent of those that responded have access 
to only one or two markets (McNabney). 
With these structural changes, the question of competition, or lack thereof, 
is often raised. There is concern among producers that fewer buyers may translate 
to lower prices for their live animals. This concern is also voiced by economists 
who believe that, since the bulk of the costs of business in meatpacking firms is 
livestock, and selling margins are on the order of one to two percent, packers can 
boost overall profits by percent simply by lowering prices paid to farmers by 
just one tenth of one percent 
Evidence to support packer competition or lack thereof is mixed. Miller and 
Harris, using regional data, found that, indeed, an increase in packer concentra-
tion does depress live hog prices. Schroeter and Azzam using national 
data, concluded that 47 percent of the farm-to-retail margin for pork, can be 
attributed to market power in the total meat industry from packing to retailing. 
The part of the marketing channel which exerts the power is not clear in the 
analysis. Azzam et al., also using national data, found no evidence of packer 
powerduringtheeightiesandthefarm-to-wholesaleporkmarginwasjustenough 
to cover hog processing costs. In another study, Schroeter and Azzam (Forthcom-
ing) attempted to determine how much of the variation in the farm-to-wholesale 
pork margin is due to market power and how much is due to output price risk. 
Interestingly, Market power was the weakest component, while output risk was 
the most prominent component in the margin. 
The Economic Problem 
The aforementioned characteristics of the sector, namely output and price 
fluctuations, the trend toward more concentrated hog production and marketings 
in larger size operations, and the trend toward larger scale slaughter operations 
seem to suggest that the hog/pork sector is a good candidate for vertical 
integration. The incentives for vertical integration, according to the popular 
view, are created by the existence of transactional economies. 
In practical terms, transactional economies exist when the cost of open 
market exchange exceeds the costs of gaining control over quality, quantity, and 
price of the intermediate product either through direct ownership or contracting. 
If processors integrate to achieve the transactional economies and the market 
remains competitive, the cost savings from integration eventually will be passed 
on the producers or consumers. 
Another less obvious phenomenon which gives rise to several incentives for 
processors to vertically integrate, aside from transactional economies, is imperfect 
competition. Imperfect competition may arise, for example, when there is only one 
ora few hog buyers in the area. The incentives come from three sources: internalization 
of the efficiency losses from imperfect competition, 2) the ability to extract rents from 
the competitive producers, and 3) the ability to price discriminate between the 
competitive producers of the intermediate inputs (Perry, 1978). 
Objectives: 
The specific objective of this report is to provide some insights on the likely 
impacts of vertical integration when the incentives arise due to imperfect 
competition. The report is not normative, i.e., designed to tell individual 
producers what actions to take or not to take in the face of the changing structure 
of the hog/pork industry. Rather, the report is to provide those representing the 
interests of hog producers with an economic framework for evaluating the likely 
price and quantity impacts of vertical integration under imperfect competition. 
As a background, the next chapter will a) examine the concepts and 
determinants of vertical integration in greater detail (both under the transactional 
economies and the imperfect competition argument), b) report on results of a 
survey of vertical integration by packers, and c) use the theory of vertical 
integration under imperfect competition to develop a simulation model useful in 
assessing the likely impacts of vertical integration in the pork industry. 
The general objective of this report is to provide some insights into the nature 
and determinants of vertical integration, and provide a theoretical and empirical 
assessment of the likely impact of increased vertical control in the hog industry 
on prices and quantities. 
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CHAPTER II 
VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
Definition 
The simplest definition of vertical integration, for our purposes, is the linking 
of two or more adjacent stages in the production-marketing process either 
through direct ownership or contractual arrangements. This brings about the 
question of how to define a stage. At the extreme, a stage of production can be 
defined as any "distinct" activity involving the transformation of a raw product 
into a consumer product Using this definition, packers can be characterized as 
vertically integrated already; they kill the animal, clean the carcass, chill it, box 
it, and perhaps transport it 
To avoid the extreme definition of a vertical chain, Ikerd and Higgins (pp. 9-
suggest redefining vertical integration, especially in reference to food 
processing, as "a combination of two or more stages of production and marketing 
where a salable product exists at each stage or at least existed at some time in the 
past." 
Vertical integration may either be forward (closer to the consumer) or 
backward (closer to the farmer). An example of forward integration would be a 
packer (the upstream firm) vertically integrating into retailing (the downstream 
firms). An example of backward integration would be a packer vertically 
integrating into hog production. This report deals exclusively with backward 
integration. 
Backward integration may be accomplished through full ownership, contrac-
tual arrangements, or a combination thereof. Under full ownership, a business 
gains permanentand complete control overneighboring stages of production and 
distribution. Under contractual arrangements, the link between the stages is 
accomplished through contracts although ownership of the stages does not 
change. "The greater the degree of control and the longer the duration of 
contracts, the nearer contractual integration comes to being equivalent to 
integration through ownership. The less the degree of control and the shorter the 
duration of contracts, the nearer contractual integration comes to being equiva-
lent to open market coordination" (Ikerd and Higgins, p.11). 
Some Determinants of Vertical Integration: 
As was alluded to earlier, the two broad determinants of vertical integration 
are transactional economies and imperfect competition. Under transactional 
economies, we shall discuss three main sources for the incentive to integrate, 
namely risk and uncertainty, economic efficiency and assuring adequate supply 
of inputs (Crieg). 
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Transactional Economies 
The more prone an industry is to uncertain supply of a material input, the more 
likely it will opt for vertical integration or contracts as a risk-reducing strategy. 
The economic rationale for this behavior is simple. Other inputs, such as labor 
for example, have to be combined with the material input to produce a final 
output Thus, as the material input becomes more "uncertain", the ability to 
utilize the cost-minimizing levels of all inputs becomes more difficult. While 
economies of scale may exist at all stages of production and/or marketing, it may 
happen that one stage is subject to substantially more scale economies that the 
next or previous stage. Earlier discussion in Chapter I on the emerging structures 
in hog packing and hog production points to the divergent scales between the two 
stages. Consequently, a packer may opt for integration though ownership or 
contracts with several producers to match his scale of operation and, hence, 
improve economic efficiency. 
Uncertainty about the quality of inputs also induces business to integrate in order 
to have a say about how the material input is produced. Obviously, vertical integration 
through ownership gives the processor complete management control. Contractual 
integration through market-specification contracts or resource providing contracts 
also gives the processor some control over production practices. 
Assurance of adequate supply is perhaps the most often cited incentive for 
processors to integrate backward into agricultural production. According to Perry 
( 1989), the notion of "assuring supplies" is more than just avoidance of random 
fluctuations in input markets. It entails the inability to obtain the quantity and 
quality of inputs that the firm would like to purchase at the prevailing price. As 
such, it is a market imperfection and gives rise to transaction costs. The latter are 
different from production costs in that they arise from using the open market for 
transactions. Whether a business opts for market exchange or integration depends 
on cost conditions of the processing plant, variability of the raw material flows, 
and the cost associated with market exchange (Brand et al.). Following Brand et 
al. consider Figure 2.1 where the U-shaped curve represent the average cost 
Figure 2.1 
Dollars/units 
AC 1 
Ac.r-......-t..-t-__;::-.,,__..--
Q. Quantity 
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function for a typical processing plant. The minimum average cost of production 
occurs at point If the firm is only able to purchase quantity Q1, its average cost 
of processing rises from to AC1 Whether the increase in costs is actually 
between and AC1 or somewhere in between depends on the number of days 
(shifts) the firm is compelled to operate at less than full capacity. For example, 
if the processor operates at less than full capacity half of the time, then its annual 
production will be at at an average cost of The potential cost saving due 
to integration are represented by the distance to Whether a business 
integrates backward to assure supplies, depends on whether the cost savings more 
than offset the costs of internally producing the material input or acquiring it 
through contracts. 
JmperfectCompetidon 
Economic theory predicts that when a market for an intermediate input is 
dominated by one buyer (monopsonist) or few buyers (oligopsonists) the price 
and quantity of the intermediate inputs would be less than what they would be 
had the market been perfectly competitive. The degree to which the quantity and 
price of the input diverge from the competitive level depends on the degree of 
market power exercised by the buyers of the intermediate inputs. The degree of 
market power is a function of three things: The number of firms, the nature of 
strategic behavior between the buyers, and the degree of supply response of the 
producers of the intermediate inputs. 
Economic theory also predicts that when the price of the intermediate inputs 
diverges from its competitive levels, an efficiency loss arises. In practical terms, 
the efficiency loss is the difference between the dollar loss to consumers and 
producers (engendered by market imperfections) and the extra profits made by 
the processor (also engendered by market imperfections). Interestingly, one way 
for the processor to convert the efficiency loss to profits is through backward 
integration. 
To illustrate this economic phenomenon, Figure 2.2 shows the link between 
the output market (panel a) and the input market (panel b ). For our purposes, the 
output market is the market for pork, and input market is the market for slaughter 
hogs. In panel a, the demand for pork is shown as the downward sloping demand 
curve D. The horizontal line, also in panel a, stands for the marginal processing 
costs of slaughter hogs. For simplicity, we assume marginal cost (MC) is equal 
to average cost (AC). The vertical distance between the demand curve D and the 
horiwntal line MC=AC is the derived demand (DD) for live hogs (shown in panel 
b ). The curve is the supply curve oflive hogs, where Q stands for both live 
hogs and pork. TheintersectionofDDandS(Q,l)givesthe(equilibrium)quantity 
of slaughter hogs, Q(l) bought by packers had the market been perfectly 
competitive. The equilibrium price paid to producers is w(l ). The pork is sold to 
the consumer at price p( 1) in panel a. If there is only one buyer in the market, or 
a few buyers who behave like one, quantity is the only quantity consistent 
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Figure 2.2: A Graphical IDustration of the Relationship Between Integration, Prices and 
Quantities 
with maximum profit It is the quantity resulting from DD and is 
the schedule of additional expenditures a single buyer in the market must incur 
to acquire additional hogs. At quantity the price paid to the (non-integrated) 
producer is and the price paid by the consumer at retail is Hence, as 
one would expect, the margin under imperfect competition, is wider 
than the margin under perfect competition, P(l)-w(l). The efficiency loss from 
restricting quantity and lowering the price to the producer is represented by the 
triangle bed. 
To see how integration converts the area bed to profits, note that profits to the 
packer at are represented by the area abcl. At Q( 1), they are represented 
by area w(l)acd. The difference between the two areas is the triangle bed. The 
area abd is the difference between the net revenue to the packer (net of other 
processing costs) and the cost of hogs The area w(O)abcd 
is the netrevenueOabQ(l) minus production costs OcQ(l) plus the rent paid to 
the producers who integrate with the packer 
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As will be apparent from the survey results, complete integration in hog 
production is nonexistent. So one has to look at what is likely to happen when a 
packer only partially integrates. The concept of partial integration can be easily 
understood intuitively but is extremely difficult to handle theoretically. The 
reason is that one has to a) say something about what the hog supply curve looks 
like when there is partial integration, and b) what happens to the price received 
by the independent producers. Professor Perry (1978), an eminent industrial 
organization economist, has devised an economic model which handles the issue 
of partial integration. 
In the next chapter, we will outline our survey results. Our aim in the final 
chapter of this report is to operationalire Perry's model and simulate likely 
impacts on prices, quantities, and earnings of independent producers by degree 
of integration in the industry. 
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CHAPTER3 
CURRENT STATUS-SURVEY 
To assess the extent of contractual and/or ownership integration by packers, 
requests for information were sent to both cattle and hog packers (small and large) 
in the continental United States. From the surveys returned, 185 contained usable 
information. The packers who responded did so voluntarily and may or may not 
be representative of packers who did not respond. Therefore, one should be 
cautious in drawing inferences about the whole population. 
Characteristics of Respondents 
A total of 185 packers responded to our survey: 83 from the North Central 
(NC) region, 41 from the East Cost (EC) region, and 61 from the rest of the nation 
Of the 185 packers, slaughtered hogs: 62 in NC, in EC and 38 in 
Of the who slaughtered hogs, 72reportedannual slaughterofless than 
head, 27 slaughtered between and head, 9 slaughtered 
between and and 14 slaughtered more head. Seven of 
the respondents did not report their slaughter volume. Of the 83 respondents in 
NC, 25 percent slaughtered cattle only, percent slaughtered hogs only, and 45 
percent slaughtered both. The total number of packers who slaughtered hogs was 
62. About 85 percent of those slaughtering hogs also engaged in further 
processing and 32 percent produced brand labels. Ninety four percent of the hog 
packers operated 1 shift operations w bile 6 percent operated a 2 shift operations. 
The 62 hog packers represented a daily slaughter capacity of head. The 
actual daily slaughter by the 62 firms was about head/day, or 83 percent 
of capacity. Sixty seven percent of total hog slaughter was done by the upper 9 
percent of hog packers. 
Twenty seven percent of the respondents in EC handled cattle only, 22 
percent hog only, and 51 percent handled both. The total number of hog packers 
was 87 percent of whom did both slaughter and processing, 37 percent did 
slaughter and brand labels, and 27 percent engaged in slaughter, processing and 
brand labels. Total slaughter capacity reported was 29,543 head/day. Actual 
slaughter reported was 26,136 head/day. This represents about 78 percent 
capacity. Ten percent of the respondents slaughtered 94 percent of the total 
slaughter in the region. 
Thirty nine percent of the respondents from slaughter cattle only, 
percent hogs only, and 43 percent do both. The maximum slaughter capacity 
reported by hog packers in was head/day. The total head/day capacity 
for all the respondents is Actual slaughter reported was 3294 head/dy, or 
73 percent capacity. Forty percent of slaughter was handled by 5 percent of the 
respondents. 
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Contractual and Ownership Integration 
Both hog and cattle packers were asked to indicate the percentage of cattle 
and hogs acquired from public markets, direct purchase, forward contracts, 
custom lots/facilities and company owned lots/facilities. Responses were first 
categorized by size of annual slaughter capacity nationally, then by region and 
size of slaughter capacity. The annual slaughter size categories, for both cattle 
and hogs, are< 99 ,999, ,999, and head and 
over. 
National Breakdown by Size 
As shown in Figure 3.1, hog packers who slaughtered head or less 
annually acquired about 38.56 percent of their hogs from public markets, 58.64 
percent by direct purchase, and 2.67 percent through forward cash contacts. The 
percentage of hogs actually owned and fed by the hog packer in company owned 
facilities represented only percent The seventy two hog packers who 
responded to the survey represent more than half the actual packer population in 
the< category reported in 1988. Assuming the response to our survey is 
representative of this category, and knowing that close to hogs were 
slaughtered by packers in the head and less category, roughly hogs 
were owned and fed in packer-owned facilities. Figure 3.1, also shows the same 
breakdown for beef packers in the same size category. Itis worth noting that while 
acquiring cattle through contracts represents only 1 percent in this size category, 
compared to 3 percent in hogs, about 5 percent of the cattle is actually owned in 
this category. About two percent is owned and fed in custom lots and 3 percent 
is owned and fed in company-owned lots. 
Public Markets 
Direct Purchase 
Hogs Cattle 
Figure 3.1: Slaughter Hogs/Cattle by Source Packer Size< head 
Packer ownership of hogs in company-owned facilities is little bit higher in 
the to head category. It represented about percent of all hogs 
in this category a range from to percent The rest was acquired from either 
public markets or direct purchase (Figure 3.2). Figure 3.2 also shows how the 
distribution of hogs by source compares with cattle. Again, cattle owned and fed 
in company facilities in this category is more than three times that of hogs. One 
beef packer in this category reported owning percent of his slaughter cattle. 
Hogs 
Cattle 
Figure 3.2: Slaughter Hogs/Cattle by Source. Packer Size 99,999 head 
Hogs Cattle 
Figure 3.3: Slaughter Hogs/Cattle by Source. Packer Size 100,000 299,999 head 
Hogs Cattle 
Figure 3.4: Slaughter Hogs/Cattle by Source. Packer Size> head 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the distribution of hogs by source for the two size 
categories 100,000-299,999 head and > head, respectively .. In the 
,999 head category, none of the hogs were contracted orowned. On 
the other hand, 1.43 percent of cattle in the same category were forward 
contracted and close to 3 percent were owned and fed in custom lot facilities. 
In the higher category,> head (Figure 3 .4 ), close to 8 percent of hogs 
fall in the captive category, of which 3.64 percent is forwardcontracted,2 percent 
is owned and fed in custom facilities, and 1.86 percent in company-owned 
facilities. Assuming the proportion of the captive hog supplies are representative 
of the population (57 plants), the total number of hogs in> category is 
roughly 5.8 million head. Beef packers in this category, on the other hand, 
acquired about 11 percent of their supply through contracts and 1.4 percent 
through ownership and feeding in custom lots. 
Figure 3.5 summarizes the above information across sizes. It is worth noting 
that while contracting and ownership of cattle seems to take place across all sizes 
in beef packing, it is mostly prevalent ·among the large sizes in hog packing. 
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Figure 3.5: Slaughter Hogs/Cattle By Source and Category 
Regional Breakdown by Size 
North Central Region 
Thirty one of the respondents from NC reported annual hog slaughter of 
or less, eleven reported annual slaughter between and 
head, 6 between and head and, 3 slaughtered over head 
annually, and 3 did not answer. Figure 3.6 shows the percentage of hogs by 
slaughter capacity and source. The percentages indicate on the average, the bulk 
of slaughter hogs in NC are still acquired through public markets ( 43 percent) and 
direct purchase (53 percent). Cash forward contracts were less than 1 percent of 
all volume. The breakdown of source of hogs by slaughter capacity, on the other 
hand, shows contracting activity among the large packers only (4 percent of the 
hogs in this category were acquired through forward contracts). 
Public Markets 
Custom 
Direct Purchase Forward Contracts 
Company 
Figure 3.6: NC Slaughter Hogs/Cattle By Source and Category 
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East Coast Region 
Eighty one of the respondents from EC reported annual hog slaughter of 
or less, 5 reported annual slaughter between and head, 1 
between and head , and 5 slaughtered over head 
annually. Figure 3.7 shows the percentage of hogs acquired by slaughter capacity 
and by source. The average for the region indicate that close to percent of the 
hogs falls in the category of captive supplies, of which 7.33 percent were acquired 
through forward contracts, percent through ownership in custom facilities, 
and 1.33 percent through ownership in company-owned facilities. The eighteen 
packers in the< category reported an average captured supply of 11.23 
percent, of which was acquired through contracts and .56 percent through 
ownership in company-owned facilities. 
The five packers in the top slaughter category(> reported an average 
captured supply of 20 percent, 2 percent of which was through forward contracts, 
9 .33 through ownership in custom facilities, and 8.67 percent in company-owned 
facilities . Ownership in custom facilities ranged from no-ownership to 28 
percent. Ownership in company-owned facilities ranged from 1 to 22 percent. 
...... ..-.. ........ .ea""""'u•1 ....... .u.""""'·......_..ea.u.1 .............. u_..,'""'".ea.tt-10...._ ...... .._.. .......... ----- - -
Markets Direct Purchase Contracts 
Custom Lots Company Lots 
Figure 3.7: EC Slaughter Hogs/Cattle By Source and Category 
Rest of Nation 
From the 37 packers who reported hog slaughter in 24 were in the< 
10,000 category, 11 in the 10,000-100,000 category and only 2 in the 100,000 and 
over. The percentages for the were as follows: 32.41 % of the hogs were 
acquired from public markets, 66.78% by direct purchase, and .81 percent 
through ownership in company owned facilities. Company ownership of hogs 
was reported in category where the average percentage of hogs 
obtained through company-ownership was 2.73 percent, with a range from to 
23 
percent. Figure 3 .8 summarizes the percentage of hogs acquired by region and 
by source. 
EC 
Forward Contract 
Company Owned Lots 
Public Markets 
Purchase 
Figure 3.8: Slaughter Hogs by Source and Region 
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NC 
Forward Contract 
CHAPTER 
PRICE AND IMPACTS OF VERTICAL 
CONTROL IN IMPERFECT MARKETS 
a) The Graphical Model 
The graphical illustration of the simulation model is presented in panel b of 
Figure 2.2. Let (I) denote the degree of integration, i.e, the fraction of hog 
suppliers integrated with the packer. Then is the new supply curve after 
that partial integration. Note that as the degree of vertical integration, I, increases 
moves toward the supply curve of the industry which represents 
the production costs of the processor when he integrates totally in the production 
of hogs, i.e I= 1. In the egg industry, for example, (I) would be close to 98 percent 
Note also as rotates clockwise toward the quantity of slaughter 
hogs produced approaches the quantity under perfect competition. Hence, when 
a processor is fully integrated, theory predicts a larger quantity of processed 
material would be produced and the consumer will benefit from the lower price 
p(l). 
At the new supply curve the quantity is Q(I). The question is what is 
the impact on the quantity of hogs and the price of hogs paid to independent 
producers as the degree of integration (I) increases. To answer the question, we 
developed a simple economic simulation model based on Perry's theoretical 
insights. Following Perry (1978), we avoid the complication of modeling 
strategic behavior between several processors, and model the problem if there 
was one sole buyer or a dominant buyer with a competitive, though insignificant, 
fringe. The model is presented without complete mathematical detail. The 
complete derivations are available form the author. 
The Algebraic Presentation 
Let the initial quantity Q(O) be and the initial price W(O) be 1. Denote 
the hog supply elasticity by (es), denote the hog (derived) demand elasticity by 
( ed), the total quantity of slaughter hogs processed by the packer by (Q), and the 
price of slaughter hogs by w. Let the supply function (Q, 1) (see graph 2.2) take 
the constant elasticity form: 
where (1) 
The derived demand function, DD on the graph, takes the constant elasticity 
form: 
=A where t=l/ed (2) 
A and Bare constants. The schedule marginal to is then 
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= (3) 
The schedule between and is represented by the 
following relationship: 
= (l+s) where Z = 1 (4) 
l 
1+I[(l+s) 5-l] 
Note that when the degree of integration is complete (I= 1) we are back to 
equation (1) which gives the supply function under full integration, and this 
supply function becomes the packers' internal cost schedule of production hogs. 
When there is no integration (1=0), we are back to equation (3) which stands 
for the marginal expenditure function of a monopsonist. To solve for the actual 
quantity of hogs slaughtered (Q) after a given degree of vertical integration (I), 
wemustequate(2)and(4)andsolveforQ(I). Todosohowever,rememberthat, 
since the supply price is initialized to 1 and the initial quantity supplied is 
initialized at 100, B must be equal to l<Xr, and A must be equal to With 
that in mind, the quantity of hogs slaughtered (Q) at each level of integration (I) 
is given by 
Q(l) = 
the price received by independents is, 
w(Q,I)= B(QZ)' 
and the net earnings (revenues minus variable costs) by independent producers 
as a function the degree of integration are 
R(l) = ((l-1/(l+s))w(Q,l)q'Z' 
Simulation Results: 
To simulate the above model, we need infonnation on the elasticities (degrees 
ofresponse) of hog supply and derived demand. For the initial run, we set the 
elasticity of hog derived-demand at-.568 (estimated independently by Schroeter 
and Azzam (1990)) and varied the elasticity of supply from .403 (also estimated 
by Schroeter and Azzam ( 1990)) to 1 ·and then 1.5. This pretty much covers the 
range of available supply elasticities available in the literature (short and long 
run). Figure 4. la plots the numerical results under the three scenarios. Indeed, as 
the degree of integration increases, hog slaughter also increases. For example, at 
an elasticity of demand of -.568 and an elasticity of supply of .40, a level of 
percent integration will bring forth about 3.8 percent increase in hog slaughter. 
Figure 4.1 also shows that as hog supply becomes more responsive, the quantity 
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of hogs forthcoming in the market is also higher. Figure 4.lb shows the 
relationship between the degree of vertical integration and hog slaughter under 
varying demand responses, holding the supply elasticity at a value of The 
more responsive is the demand curve the more quantity of hogs forthcoming 
under increasing levels of vertical integration. This also implies that the 
consumer benefits from lower prices of pork as output expands. 
Figure 4.2a demonstrate the relationship between the degree of integration 
and the quantities of hogs purchased from independents. Obviously, although the 
total quantity of hogs slaughtered increased, the quantity purchased from 
independent hog producers is predicted by the model to decrease by more than 
the increase slaughter. For example, at percent level of integration, total 
slaughter goes up by 3.8 percent but the quantity purchased form independents 
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Figure 4.2b: Degree of Integration and Quantities from Independents (ED) 
declines by 13 .3 percent. This means, given the magnitude of supply and demand 
elasticities, that the 17 percent of the hogs is being captive by the processor. 
Figure 4.2b shows the same relationship between the degree of integration and 
purchases of independents under varying demand responses. 
According to figure 4.3a, the price to independents also declines. At the ten 
percent level of integration the price paid to independents declines by about six 
percent. At fifty percent integration, the price declines by about 26 percent. The 
more responsive the hog supply curve, the steeper the decline in the price of 
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Figure 4.3b: Degree of Integration and Price Received by Independents (ED) 
independents. Similarly, the more elastic the demand curve, the steeper the price 
decline received by independents. 
Figure 4 .4 shows the decline in earnings as the degree of vertical integration 
increases. Since both the price paid to independents and quantity purchased from 
independents decline with vertical integration, their earnings naturally decline. 
However, the decline in earnings is faster than the decline in both the price and 
quantity. For example, at a level of vertical integration of IO percent, the quantity 
purchased from independents declines form to 88 ( 12 percent), price declines 
from 1 to .937 (6 percent), and earnings decline from to 82.13 (18 percent). 
Note also that the more responsive the supply curve, the steeper the decline in 
earnings to independents. 
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We should remind the reader that the importance of the above results lie in 
their qualitative rather than quantitative dimensions. They also provide a 
background for various hypotheses to be tested as integration proceeds in the 
industry. The quantitative results are the creature of the nature of supply and 
demand response assumed to be taking place in the hog/pork complex. As one 
assumes different supply and demand elasticities one would get different 
quantitative results. However, the qualitative directions indicate that increased 
packer integration in the hog industry is likely to increase overall pork produc-
tion, reduce prices to the consumer, lower the price of hogs to the independent 
producer. 
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APPENDIX 
Definition of Regions 
West North Central Region (WNC) 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Minnesota 
Missouri 
North Dakota 
Nebraska 
South Dakota 
East North Central Region (ENC) 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Michigan 
Ohio 
Wisconsin 
Northeastern Region (NE) 
Connecticut 
Massachusetts 
Maine 
New Hampshire 
New Jersey 
New York 
Pennsylvania 
Rhode Island 
Vermont 
South Atlantic Region (SA) 
Delaware 
Florida 
Georgia 
Maryland 
North Carolina 
South Carolina 
Virginia 
West Virginia 
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South Central Region (SC) 
Alabama 
Arkansas 
Kentucky 
Louisiana 
Mississippi 
Oklahoma 
Tennessee 
Texas 
Western Region (W) 
Arkansas 
Arizona 
California 
Colorado 
Hawaii 
Idaho 
Montana 
New Mexico 
Nevada 
Oregon 
Utah 
Washington 
Wyoming 

